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IT’S TIME FOR POSTAL BANKING 
Mehrsa Baradaran∗ 
 One of the biggest problems in banking today is the large and ever-
increasing population of the unbanked — those who are not gaining 
the benefits of the regulated banking system and must rely on high-
cost fringe lenders to do simple transactions like cash their paychecks.  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau have listed this problem as a top agenda item.1  
After decades of unsuccessful regulatory proposals, the solution may 
finally be at hand.  On January 27, 2014, the Office of the Inspector 
General of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) released a white paper that 
proposed that the USPS consider offering financial services to the  
underbanked.2  Senator Elizabeth Warren has also publicly expressed 
support for the idea.3  The proposal was immediately criticized by the 
banking industry as “the worst idea since the Edsel.”4  The main stat-
ed concern is that the Post Office lacks the institutional capacity to 
provide financial services.5  But anticompetitive concerns — namely 
that a large, well-funded competitor will cut into banks’ business — 
likely play a role too, as they did in 2005 when Walmart attempted to 
obtain a banking charter.6 
As I have written previously,7 and banking-industry concerns not-
withstanding, the USPS is in a unique position to provide much-
needed financial services for the large population of unbanked or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
 1 See Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein (last updated Feb. 14, 2014) (outlining the Committee’s ongoing 
initiatives to expand access to underserved populations); Kelly Thompson Cochran, Fall 2013 
Rulemaking Agenda, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/category/rulemaking/. 
 2 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UN-
DERSERVED (2014), available at http://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-
files/2014/rarc-wp-14-007.pdf. 
3 Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Coming to a Post Office Near You: Loans You Can Trust, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-warren/coming-to-a-post-office-
n_b_4709485.html.  
 4 Rachel Witkowski & Kevin Wack, Post Office Offering Loans Is ‘Worst Idea Since the 
Edsel’: Banks, AM. BANKER (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_18/post-office-offering-loans-is-worst-idea-since-the-
edsel-banks-1065231-1.html.  The Edsel was a famous Ford marketing disaster. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Michael Barbaro, Bankers Oppose Wal-Mart as Rival, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/business/15walmart.html. 
 7 Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483 (2013).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393621 
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underbanked Americans.8  First, the Post Office can offer credit at 
lower rates than fringe lenders by taking advantage of economies of 
scale as well as its position in the federal bureaucracy.  Second, it al-
ready has branches in many low-income neighborhoods that have been 
long deserted by commercial banks.  And third, people at every level 
of society, including the unbanked, have a level of familiarity and com-
fort with the Post Office that they do not have with more formal bank-
ing institutions. 
This Essay moves one step further by demonstrating why govern-
ment support and even subsidies to enable postal banking in the Unit-
ed States are appropriate and justifiable.  First, banking-related subsi-
dies are grounded in historical practice, as demonstrated by 
government support for credit unions, savings and loans, and student 
loan associations.  Postal banking derives from these longstanding 
practices, but broadens the scope to include the poor, not just the mid-
dle class.  Further, state support of banking throughout U.S. history 
has operated much like a social contract: the state supports the bank-
ing system in a variety of ways and, in return, banks serve as credit 
intermediaries, providing the populace with access to loans and finan-
cial services.  Thus, subsidies for banking have been justified because 
they provide a benefit to all citizens.  Mainstream banks have met part 
of their obligation, but a large portion of the population, namely the 
poor, has been left out.  It is time, then, for the government itself to 
meet the demand for credit. 
I.  HOW THE POST OFFICE CAN BANK THE UNBANKED 
The unbanked and underbanked population in the United States is 
significant, with far-reaching consequences.  Approximately 88 million 
people in the United States 38% of the population, are unbanked or 
underbanked.9  Indeed, nearly half of U.S. adults could not access 
$2000 within thirty days to respond to an emergency.10  To meet their 
short-term credit needs, these individuals and families must rely on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 The term “unbanked” refers to individuals who have no formal relationship with a bank; 
the “underbanked” are individuals who may have a formal relationship with a mainstream bank, 
but primarily rely on fringe banking institutions for their banking or credit needs.  See KPMG, 
SERVING THE UNDERSERVED MARKET 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/ 
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/serving-underserved-market.pdf. 
 9 See id. at 1. 
 10 See An Examination of the Availability of Credit for Consumers: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 141 n.1 
(2011) (prepared statement of Robert W. Mooney, Deputy Director, Consumer Protection and 
Consumer Affairs), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72606/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg72606.pdf; see also ANNAMARIA LUSARDI ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
FINANCIALLY FRAGILE HOUSEHOLDS: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Spring%202011/2011a_bpea_lusardi.pdf. 
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payday lenders, check cashers, or other fringe banking institutions.  
These lenders are often usurious, sometimes predatory, and almost al-
ways much worse for low-income individuals than the services offered 
by traditional banks to their customers.  For instance, the average an-
nual income for an unbanked family is $25,500, and about 10% of that 
income, or $2412, goes to the fees and interest paid to access credit or 
other financial services — services that those with bank accounts often 
get for free.11  Cutting down these payments would help many avoid 
bankruptcy; those who filed for bankruptcy in 2012 were, on average, 
just $26 per month short of meeting their expenses.12  The Post Office 
can address this problem and lower these credit costs for the three rea-
sons outlined below. 
A.  Economies of Scale 
There are economic justifications for charging higher interest rates 
to those with lower incomes.  The poor pay more for credit than the 
middle class because they are more likely to default and lenders must 
be compensated for assuming this risk.  In other words, those least 
likely to be able to pay their debts are charged a premium for that in-
ability.  But even assuming that the risk presented by low-income bor-
rowers is accurately priced by fringe lenders (a proposition that the 
available data does not strongly support13), the Post Office can still 
provide these services at a lower price.  In fact, the USPS white paper 
claims that the Post Office could offer a $375 loan with interest and 
fees totaling $48, as opposed to $520 for the average payday loan for 
that amount.14  This discount is possible because the Post Office is 
able to operate with less overhead than fringe lenders and because it 
can benefit from economies of scale.  It could reduce costs by using its 
existing infrastructure and clientele.  In addition, its collection costs 
could be lower because it may be able to enlist the help of the IRS and 
other federal enforcement mechanisms that can easily garnish wages or 
tax returns.15  It can also offer smaller individual loans that yield 
smaller margins by doing so at a greater volume. 
B.  Proximity 
Moreover, the Post Office is uniquely positioned to solve the prob-
lems of credit access for the poor because post offices remain in the 
low-income neighborhoods that banks abandoned.  The banking  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 12 Id. at ii, 14. 
 13 Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 18 
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005). 
 14 See U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 2, at 13. 
 15 See id. at 14. 
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industry underwent a significant transformation during the 1970s and 
1980s as mainstream commercial banks faced increased competition 
from other financial institutions.  This market pressure on traditional 
banks was a result of technological advances coupled with swift de-
regulation.16  Forced to compete, banks shed their less-profitable prod-
ucts, namely small loans to lower income communities.  The poor may 
need banks, but the reverse is certainly not true.  Many mainstream 
banks hold the position that “[p]roviding financial services to the poor 
is fundamentally unprofitable.”17  Assuming the same risk of default, it 
costs a bank roughly the same amount of overhead and transactional 
costs to lend $1000 as it does $100,000, with the latter yielding a great-
er profit.  In pursuit of higher profit margins, banks closed branches in 
lower-income neighborhoods en masse.  And once they did, the fringe 
lenders moved in.18 
Thus, a significant barrier to banking the poor is the dearth of 
bank branches in low-income areas.  Chartered banks are regulated by 
state and federal laws and therefore have usury limits, or interest rate 
caps, on the loans they can offer.  Fringe lenders do not.  Once the 
regulated banks left these communities, so did reasonable interest 
rates.  For decades, banking regulators and advocacy groups have 
been trying to lure mainstream banks back to these neighborhoods 
through legislation and agency action, using both carrots and sticks.19  
These efforts have not succeeded and have faced significant industry 
opposition.  Post offices, on the other hand, have always been a part of 
nearly every zip code across the country.  This fact, above others, 
makes postal banking a uniquely appealing idea.  
C.  Familiarity and Comfort 
The third major advantage of postal banking is that Post Offices 
provide a more welcoming atmosphere, overcoming many cultural 
barriers that lead the poor to avoid banks.  Analyzing the de-
mographics of the unbanked while controlling for income reveals that 
there are racial and cultural barriers that keep many people away from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (explain-
ing the shifts in banking during this time). 
 17 Sow Hup Chan, An Exploratory Study of Using Micro-Credit to Encourage the Setting Up 
of Small Businesses in the Rural Sector of Malaysia, 4 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 455, 456 (2005).  
But see David Malmquist et al., The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending, 11 J. FIN. 
SERVS. RES. 169, 182 (1997) (“[L]ow-income lending is no more and no less profitable than non-
low-income lending . . . .”). 
 18 JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND 
THE POOR 7 (1994). 
 19 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGU-
LATION 328 (2d ed. 1997). 
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banking.  For example, more blacks and Hispanics are unbanked than 
whites, as are more women than men.20  Many of the unbanked report 
being more comfortable in fringe banking institutions than in banks.21  
Payday lenders deal behind a façade of informality.  They operate in 
cash, in the direct vicinity of their customers, and usually in their lan-
guage.22  This business model seems to be in direct contrast to banks 
with their rigid hours, requirements, and procedures.  While the Post 
Office will not be able to overcome all of these barriers, its branches 
are more accessible places than commercial banks because of their 
presence in low-income neighborhoods and their informality.  The Post 
Office is not an intimidating institution; the poor know its location and 
understand its processes.  For all the Post Office’s flaws, rich and poor 
across the country are familiar with its locations and often even the 
postal employees behind the counter.23 
To be sure, there are private institutions with similar capacities, but 
they are not likely to provide a solution anytime soon.  Walmart, for 
example, recently started offering simple financial services, such as 
check cashing and prepaid cards, at a discount to its customers.24  
However, the retail giant, having been definitively denied a banking 
charter, cannot offer credit — the most-needed financial product.  The 
postal system, in contrast, is well positioned to overcome most of the 
hurdles to banking the poor due to its ability to take advantage of 
economies of scale, its presence in poorer neighborhoods, and its long-
standing relationship of trust with all of America’s communities. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17–18 (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/ 
2012_unbankedreport.pdf. 
 21 Why the Working Poor and Banks Are a Bad Match, AM. BANKER (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/video/why-the-working-poor-and-banks-are-a-bad-
match1064854-1.html (Heather Landy, Editor in Chief, American Banker Magazine, interviewing 
Lisa Servon, Professor of Management and Urban Policy, The New School). 
 22 See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encour-
ages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 13 (2003).  Stegman and Faris cite to 
[f]ocus groups of low-income and ethnic consumers . . . [that] identified five ways in 
which check cashers were superior to banks: (a) easier access to immediate cash; (b) 
more accessible locations; (c) better service in the form of shorter lines, more tellers, 
more targeted product mix in a single location, convenient operating hours, and Span-
ish-speaking tellers; (d) more respectful, courteous treatment of customers; and (e) great-
er trustworthiness. 
Id. 
 23 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 24 Maria Aspan, For Wal-Mart, No Bank Charter Is No Problem, AM. BANKER (Nov. 11, 
2009), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/174_218/for-wal-mart-no-bank-charter-is-no-
problem-1003891-1.html. 
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II.  WHY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD  
SUPPORT POSTAL BANKING 
The opposition to postal banking is likely to center on the idea that 
this service functions as an inappropriate federal subsidy to the poor.  
But any direct or indirect subsidy of banking access for the poor is 
supported both historically and theoretically. 
A.  Historical Support 
Postal banking is not unprecedented in the United States.  In 1873, 
President Grant’s Postmaster General proposed a government-
sponsored savings program, modeled after one started in Britain.25  In 
1910, President Taft responded to growing populist proposals to estab-
lish a government-backed savings system for recent immigrants and 
the poor.26  The Postal Savings System was created to enable the poor 
to save money with the assurance of a government guarantee that their 
deposits were protected.27  This program was created and geared to 
recent immigrants and the unbanked poor, and was wildly successful: 
at the end of the first year, there was a total of $20 million in deposits, 
“most of which had been coaxed out of hiding.”28  The director of 
postal savings, Carter Keene, declared in 1913 that the postal savings 
system was not meant to yield a profit: 
Its aim is infinitely higher and more important.  Its mission is to encour-
age thrift and economy among all classes of citizens.  It stands for good 
citizenship and tends to diminish crime.  It places savings facilities at the 
very doors of those living in remote sections, and it also affords opportuni-
ty for safeguarding the savings of thousands who have absolute confidence 
in the Government and will trust no other institution.29 
Throughout American history, there have been various state-
supported attempts to meet the banking needs of the poor — both for 
depositary services and credit.  Policymakers have largely recognized 
that access to financial services and credit is a significant step toward 
individual economic advancement.30  Credit gives the poor the ability 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND 87–91 (1992). 
 26 Id. at 88. 
 27 Id. at 90; Postal Savings System, USPS (July 2008), http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/ 
postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf. 
 28 GRANT, supra note 25, at 90. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 134–41 (2004); see also 
STACIE CARNEY & WILLIAM G. GALE, ASSET ACCUMULATION AMONG LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 22 (2000), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gale/19991130.pdf 
(finding households without bank accounts forty-three percent less likely to have positive 
holdings of net financial assets); Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks at the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors (Jan. 28, 2000) (describing individual access to financial services,  
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to absorb financial reversals, the means to start or expand a small 
business, and the capacity to build a financial cushion to withstand in-
dividual economic shocks.31  Several studies have demonstrated that 
when poor communities are provided access to credit and other bank-
ing services, they thrive economically.32  Studies also show that small-
scale credit leads to increased income and savings among borrowers.33  
The converse is also true: barriers to credit significantly hamper the 
economic development of poor communities and individuals.34 
For most of this country’s history, the credit needs of the poor and 
middle class were met by banking institutions specifically created and 
designed to appeal to them, such as credit unions, savings and loan as-
sociations, and the smaller Morris Banks.35  Credit unions were a pop-
ulist innovation designed as cooperatives not only to provide access to 
credit, but also to provide federal insurance to protect investments.36  
Savings and loan associations (S&Ls) were formally created in the 
1930s to offer affordable mortgage loans to lower- and middle-class 
people.37  These institutions began as cooperatives with shared owner-
ship, a structure that led to the forbearance of profit.38  In contrast, the 
little-known Morris Bank was a for-profit banking venture aimed at 
the “democratization of credit,” created to give the poor increased ac-
cess to credit.39  Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks were alterna-
tives to mainstream banks, but they were all supported and subsidized 
by the federal government through targeted regulation and deposit in-
surance protection.40 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
specifically bank accounts, as the “basic passport to the broader economy”), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls356.aspx. 
 31 See Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the 
Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2004) 
(“Access to credit assures access to basic necessities for debtors who, because of un- or under-
employment, lack an adequate income to pay for essentials like food, shelter, and medicine.”). 
 32 See THE WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL?: POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPAND-
ING ACCESS 99–139 (2008) (concluding that “the bulk of the evidence suggests financial develop-
ment and improved access to finance is likely not only to accelerate economic growth but also to 
reduce income inequality and poverty,” id. at 138); J. Wyatt Kendall, Note, Microfinance in Rural 
China: Government Initiatives to Encourage Participation by Foreign and Domestic Financial 
Institutions, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 375, 377 (2008) (“Researchers have demonstrated that there 
is a strong, positive correlation between an individual’s access to traditional banking services and 
an individual’s well-being.”). 
 33 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 99–139; Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: 
Human Reconstruction in America’s Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 199 (1992). 
 34 See Kendall, supra note 32, at 375 (“[P]eople with access to banking services live above the 
poverty line, whereas those without access to banking services live below the poverty line.”). 
 35 Baradaran, supra note 7, at 486. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 GRANT, supra note 25, at 77, 85. 
 40 Baradaran, supra note 7, at 487. 
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As described above, banking forms homogenized in the 1970s and 
1980s, leaving little room for variation in institutional or regulatory de-
sign.41  Eventually, each of these institutions drifted from their initial 
mission of serving the poor and began to look more like commercial 
banks, even competing with them for ever-shrinking profit margins.  
The result now is essentially two forms of banks: regulated main-
stream banks that seek maximum profit for their shareholders by serv-
ing the needs of the wealthy and middle class, and unregulated fringe 
banks that seek maximum profits for their shareholders by serving the 
banking and credit needs of the poor.  What is missing from the Amer-
ican banking landscape for the first time in almost a century is a gov-
ernment-sponsored bank whose main purpose is to meet the needs of 
the poor.  Rather than relegating the poor to fringe banks, policymak-
ers should carve out a place for banks that serve the poor and enable 
them to survive and thrive.  This charge has deep historic roots in U.S. 
banking. 
B.  The Normative Case 
As I have written elsewhere, the state has always had a social con-
tract with its banks, which at times has been explicit and at times im-
plicit, but always with the same understanding: the state provides 
banks with public trust (through insurance and implicit bailouts) — 
trust that is necessary for their survival; in return, banks provide 
much-needed credit, savings, and financial intermediation services for 
individuals and institutions.42  Currently, a few large and powerful 
banks, who continue to benefit from trillions of dollars of federal gov-
ernment subsidies, control the majority of assets in the banking sector 
and also the majority of credit.43  And this credit is not reaching the 
poor.44  If the banking system is to be supported by the government, 
the entire citizenry should be able to access its services.  Insofar as a 
heavily subsidized banking sector is the status quo and that sector does 
not benefit the entire population, a government subsidy to lend to the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. S93, S94 (1991). 
 42 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283 
(2014). 
 43 There are twelve “mega banks” after the financial crisis with assets between $250 billion 
and $2.3 trillion; they represent only 0.2% of all banks, but together they hold almost 70% of the 
country’s banking assets.  Richard Fisher, President, Fed. Res. Bank of Dall., Ending ‘Too Big to 
Fail’: A Proposal for Reform Before It’s Too Late (With Reference to Patrick Henry, Complexity 
and Reality), Remarks Before the Committee of the Republic (Jan. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130116.cfm. 
 44 Kirk Shinkle, America’s Credit Catastrophe, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2008/10/03/americas-credit-
catastrophe. 
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poor simply provides another mechanism for reaching the same policy 
goals.  And if the banks benefiting from subsidies are no longer taking 
up the task, the government should do so directly. 
The federal government subsidizes other credit products to achieve 
important policy goals but, thus far, these programs have been pri-
marily designed for the middle class.  The government sponsors and 
underwrites private student loans.  A student borrower who qualifies 
for such a loan receives credit at a below-market interest rate and re-
mains indebted to the government until the loan is paid off.  The gov-
ernment supports such loans because they facilitate an important pub-
lic objective — educating the population.  The government also 
creates and supports a secondary mortgage market to promote the pol-
icy goal of increased home-ownership.45  Enabling the poor to escape 
poverty is no less important a public concern.  Offering good credit to 
the poor would enable economic mobility, which has lagged signifi-
cantly in the United States in recent years, and solve a variety of other 
public problems linked to entrenched poverty.  Given the recent deba-
cles of federally funded institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,46 the federal government would have to be cautious in taking on 
risks associated with lending to the poor.  However, these services do 
not entail the scope of risks associated with home mortgages.  Cashing 
a check for a small fee or offering a payday loan often involve much 
less risk. 
After the recent global financial crisis, any call for easing credit of 
any kind is suspect because of the widespread, yet inaccurate, belief 
that the financial crisis was precipitated by an overabundance of con-
sumer access to mortgage credit.47  Therefore, the case for increasing 
consumer access to credit is a politically difficult one to make.  How-
ever, the status quo is not sustainable as onerous interest rates make it 
much more difficult for individuals to escape poverty and growing in-
come disparity has various negative economic effects.48  Bank credit 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN 
THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 15–19 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12032/12-23-fanniefreddie.pdf. 
 46 See generally VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE 
MAC AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE (2011), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences/gse/White.pdf. 
 47 Most experts claim that although lower underwriting standards were a factor in the finan-
cial crisis, the causes of the crisis were much more global and complex.  The Turner Review, the 
most comprehensive economic analysis of the financial crisis, cited macro imbalances of funds 
(that is, over-savings by the Chinese and oil-producing nations) mixed with financial innovation 
and complexity in the U.S. and U.K. derivatives markets.  FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER 
REVIEW (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 48 Robert C. Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility: Some Empir-
ics in the Political Economy of Finance, 18 N.C. BANKING L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710. 
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not only allows the economy to grow wealth, but also allows individu-
al families to do so.  Any difference in credit access undermines the 
justifications for state support of banks.  Insofar as economic mobility 
is a social good, and credit is a necessary tool for economic advance-
ment, government policies should be aimed at enhancing access for all 
individuals and communities.  Access to safe credit is crucial in allow-
ing the poor to escape poverty. 
C.  A Case for Caution 
One thing that could undermine postal banking would be inappro-
priate profit-seeking.  Attempts to regulate the private market have 
demonstrated that institutions with an eye toward profit maximization 
have been unable or unwilling to meet the credit needs of the poor.49  
In February 2008, the FDIC began the “Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Pro-
gram,” a two-year campaign to enlist mainstream banks to loan to the 
poor.50  The project was described as “a case study designed to illus-
trate how banks can profitably offer affordable small-dollar loans as 
an alternative to high-cost credit products, such as payday loans and 
fee-based overdraft protection.”51  The program, which enlisted twen-
ty-eight volunteer banks, was a failure.  A congressional review com-
mittee noted that banks were charging the maximum rates allowed in 
the program — 36% APR and 20% charges on cashed checks, which 
were not much better than payday loans.52  The main reason this pro-
gram failed is that mainstream banks do not have the incentive to sac-
rifice profits to meet the needs of the poor.  They must survive and 
stay profitable in a competitive banking market, and when they offer 
low-cost loans to the poor, they lose their competitive position and hurt 
their bottom line.  Policymakers misunderstand the nature of main-
stream banks if they are relying on them to adequately meet the needs 
of the poor.  At best, banks can be incentivized to meet the poor’s 
banking needs merely to appease regulators.  The products the banks 
offer are not innovative fruits of market research about what the poor 
really need — the banks offer the bare minimum so that they can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Solomon, supra note 33, at 206 (discussing the struggles of the microcredit movement in the 
United States). 
 50 Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/ 
smalldollarloans (last updated June 23, 2010). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Press Release, Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am., FiSCA Issues Critique of FDIC Small Dollar Loan 
Program: Shortcomings Cited in the Report Underscore Challenges Banks Face in Serving Con-
sumers Needing Small Dollar, Short-Term Loans (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/NewsViews/PressReleases/2009PressReleases/FDI
C-PressRelease.pdf. 
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maintain profitability while fulfilling a regulatory mandate.53  Forcing 
banks, whose purpose is to maximize profits, to make loans to the poor 
will inevitably lead to inadequate loans and disgruntled bankers. 
Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks, in contrast, were able to 
successfully reach the poor because doing so was their primary goal.  
And so it must be with the Post Office.  There is a troubling statement 
in the USPS white paper on this front.  The paper states that provid-
ing these services “could result in major new revenue for the Postal 
Service.”54  This motive cannot be the driving force behind this en-
deavor or else, as the pilot program example proved, it is unlikely to 
reach the goal of offering the poor the credit that they need.  This is 
not to say that the venture will not be a major new revenue source for 
the USPS.  And the competition provided by the government entering 
this sector could possibly drive prices down in the private fringe bank-
ing sector to more accurately reflect the risks of lending to the poor. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Income disparity is greater in the United States than ever before, 
and the banking industry is more heavily subsidized than at any point 
in U.S. history.  The result should be an increase in credit to those who 
most need it.  Unfortunately, the reverse is happening — the poor have 
been excluded from the credit flowing from the subsidized banking 
sector.  Any efforts at forcing that sector to provide credit to the poor 
have failed because they are institutionally designed to maximize prof-
its and lending to the poor is not conducive to profit maximization.  It 
is time for the government to step in and solve this market mismatch.  
The USPS is far from the most efficient or successful government 
agency, but it may just be the perfect institution to accomplish the 
monumental undertaking of providing the credit the poor need to  
escape poverty. 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Many of the banks volunteered for the program because they were told that they would be 
fulfilling their Community Reinvestment Act requirements.   
 54 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 2, at ii. 
